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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

GREGORY MAURICE WARD,

:

Case No. 20080478-CA

:

Appellant is incarcerated.

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is a consolidated appeal from two judgments of conviction. See Addendum
A. In case no. 071908607, Gregory Ward was convicted of one count of ThcfL, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003), the Honorable Deno G.
Ilimonas, presiding. See Addendum B. In case no. 081900984, Ward was convicted of
one count of Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(2003), the Flonorable Deno G. Himonas, presiding. See Addendum C.1 Jurisdiction is
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (Supp. 2008).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it decided not to give
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Hereinafter, case no. 071908607 will be referenced as case no. 8607 and case no.
081900984 will be referenced as case no. 0984. Citations to the record for these cases
will be to R. 8607 and R. 0984 respectively, followed by the record page in parentheses.
The transcripts will be cited as R. 41 (Sentencing Hearing) and R. 45 (Change of Plea
Hearing), without reference to either case number. Likewise, the presentence report will

Ward the benefit of the doubt by following its inclination to place him on probation and
instead sentenced him to prison.
Standard of Review; This Court reviews sentences for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). '"An abuse of discretion
may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the
judge imposed a "clearly excessive" sentence.'" State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah
1991) (citations omitted).
Preservation: This issue was preserved below at R. 41 (sentencing hearing).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201 (2008), 76-3-203 (2008), 77-18-1 (2008), 77-18-4
(2008) are determinative of this appeal. Their text is provided in full in Addendum D.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is a consolidation of the two cases. First, in case no. 8607, Mr. Ward
was charged with one count of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003). R 8607 (1-2). Following a preliminary hearing, Mr.
Ward was bound over as charged. R. 8607 (15-16).
Second, in case no. 0984, Mr. Ward was charged with one count of Theft, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003) or, in the alternative,
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302

be cited as R. 33.
2

(2003); and two counts of Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2003). R. 0984 (1-3). Following a preliminary hearing, the trial
court bound Mr. Ward over on one count of Aggravated Robbery and two counts of
Aggravated Assault. R. 0984 (16-17).
On March 14, 2008, the trial court held a change of plea hearing for both cases. R.
8607 (31 -32); 0984 (27-28); 45; sec Addendum E. Mr. Ward pleaded guilty to two
counts of theft, a second degree felony. R. 8607 (23-30; 31-32); 0984 (19-26, 27-28);
45:3. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss all other charges in both cases and to
recommend that the sentences run concurrently. R. 8607 (27); 0984 (23); 45:3.
\ presentence report (PSR) was prepared in this case. R. 33. On May 2, 2008,
Mr. Ward was sentenced in both cases. R. 8607 (34-35); 0984 (29-30); 41; see
Addendum F. In case no. 8607, the trial court ordered Mr. Ward to serve "an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than Fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison " R. 8607 (34); 41:7. In case no. 0984, the trial court ordered Mr. Ward to serve
u

an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than Fifteen years in the Utah

State Prison." R. 0984 (29); 41:7. The trial court ordered both sentences to run
concurrently and granted Mr. Ward credit for time served. R. 8607 (35); 0984 (30); 41:7.
Mr. Ward Filed a timely notice of appeal in both cases. R. 8607 (36); 0984 (31).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The information in case no. 8607, alleged that on November 15, 2007, Mr. Ward
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stole CDs, two jackets, and three bottles of beer from a Wal-Mart store. R. 8607 (2).
When confronted by two store employees, Mr, Ward said, '"I am going to shoot you, so
back off me!'" R. 8607 (2), lie then "pulled out a silver folding knife" and told the
employees that "he was going to kill them." R. 8607 (2). The information in case no.
0984, alleged that on January 14, 2008, Mr. Ward stole CDs and other merchandise from
a Smith's Food and Drug Store and, when confronted by two store employees, ordered
them to "'Back off!'" and said, "'I have a knife.'" R. 0984 (2).
When he pleaded guilty, Mr. Ward admitted that "|o]n November 15th 2007 and
January 11 |4lh 2008 in Salt Lake County," he "took property of a store without permission
and with the intent to [permanently] deprive when he possessed a dangerous instrument,
on one occasion a knife and on the [other] occasion a box cutter." R. 45:7; see also R.
8607(24); 0984(20).
The PSR recommended that Mr. Ward "be committed to the Utah State Prison for
the term prescribed by law." R. 33:2. It determined that Mr. Ward was moderately likely
to reoffend and "identified problem areas with substance abuse, criminal history, and
employment/financial." R. 33:2. It stated that Mr. Ward had been incarcerated since
January 14,2008. R. 33:4.
Regarding case no. 0984, the PSR said that Mr. Ward stole a pair of shoes, a pair
of weight lifting gloves, CDs, and four cans of beer from a Smith's Food and Drug Store.
R. 33:3. When store employees confronted him, Mr. Ward "tried to fight them off and

4

then "reached into the pocket of his coat and said: T have a knife, let me go/ He was
able to be secured without incident." R. 33:3.
Regarding case no. 8607, the PSR said that Mr, Ward stole CDs and three bottles
of beer from a Wal-Mart store. R. 33:3. When confronted by store employees, he
"threatened to shoot them with a gun and then proceeded to pull a knife on them." R.
33:3. Mr. Ward then left the store and was arrested later. R. 33:3.
The PSR showed that Mr. Ward has no juvenile record, but has an adult criminal
record. R. 33:4-6. His adult record consists mainly of misdemeanor offenses, including
possession of controlled substances, retail thefts, obstructing justice, shoplifting, one
simple assault, and one possession of a dangerous weapon. R. 33:5-6. In addition to the
present offenses, it also contains one third degree felony narcotics conviction from 1996.
R. 33:5. Based on this felony conviction, Mr. Ward was placed on probation in February
1997. R. 33:7. "He was then submitted to the Diagnostic Unit at the Utah State Prison in
July of 1997 and then committed to the Utah State Prison in September of 1997." R,
33:7. Thereafter, he was granted parole in February 1998. R. 33:2, 7. He violated parole
four times between March 1998 and June 2000. R. 33:2, 7. lie was discharged in July
2000 "after being incarcerated on his last parole violation." R. 33:2, 7.
In his statement for the PSR, Mr. Ward said, "Yes it was wrong for me to go in any
store and take things. I'm very sorry for the things I've did. It will not happen again." R.
33:4.
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On May 2, 2008, Mr. Ward was sentenced in both cases. R. 8607 (34-35); 0984
(29-30); 41. Mr. Ward asked the trial court to correct the PSR because he did not steal
four cans of beer. R. 41:2. The trial court granted Mr. Ward's request. R. 41:2. Next,
Mr. Ward asked the trial court to grant him credit for the "substantial amount of time"
that he had already served and to put him on probation. R. 41:2-3. The thefts were "very
small" and "no one was injured." R. 41:2-3. He was "just a desperate individual, and he
was living on the streets." R. 41:3. Rather than prison, Mr. Ward would benefit from
"some counseling both for mental health and for drugs." R. 41:3.
Taking into account Mr. Ward's record, the trial court agreed that the
recommendation was "a little concerning]," R. 41:3. "I've seen a lot worse. I mean, I
think we only have the one felony conviction, right?" R. 41:3. He has convictions for
"retail theft, shoplifting, retail theft, a B simple assault, retail theft," and one third degree
felony from 1996 "for narcotics." R. 41:4. "|T]his seems to me to be right on the
borderline." R. 41:4. Ultimately, an unidentified attorney clarified that Mr. Ward was
placed on probation for the 1996 felony conviction and sent to prison after he violated a
probationary term. R. 41:5. The State also asked the trial court to refuse probation
because Mr. Ward possessed a knife during both offenses and pulled the knife out during
one of the offenses. R. 41:5-6.
Speaking on his own behalf, Mr. Ward said:
Your Honor, I've made some bad choices in my life. I'm 41 years
old, and I've come to the conclusion that I can't spend the rest of my
6

life like this. I have kids that would need me, and I just need . . . a
chance to prove that I can be successful and on the streets and taking
care of my business. That's all I need is one chance, and I promise
you, you won't sec me in this Court again.
R. 41:7.
Taking the arguments into account, the trial court denied Mr. Ward's request to be
put on probation and sentenced him to serve two concurrent prison terms of one-to-fifteen
years each. R. 8607 (34-35); 0984 (29-30); 41:7.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Ward argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request
to be put on probation and instead sentenced him to serve two concurrent prison terms of
onc-to-fifteen years each. At sentencing, the trial court expressed reservations about
sending Mr. Ward to prison. Given that the trial court doubted whether prison was
appropriate for Mr. Ward and that Mr. Ward has only been on probation once before and
that was twelve years ago, Mr. Ward believes that the trial court abused its discretion by
sending him to prison rather than giving him the benefit of the doubt and placing him on
probation.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING MR.
WARD'S REQUEST TO BE PLACED ON PROBATION AND INSTEAD
SENTENCING HIM TO SERVE TWO CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS
OF ONE-TO FIFTEEN YEARS EACH.
"Probation is not a matter of right, and this is so no matter how unsullied a
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reputation one convicted of crime may be able to demonstrate to the trial judge." State v.
Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957). "The granting or withholding of probation
involves considering intangibles of character, personality and attitude, of which the cold
record gives little inkling." Id "These matters, which arc to be considered in connection
with the prior record of the accused, are of such nature that the problem of probation must
of necessity rest within the discretion of the judge who hears the case." Id. "This is not
to say that if it were clearly shown that the trial judge would have granted probation
except for some wholly irrelevant, improper or inconsequential consideration, such
refusal might be so capricious and arbitrary as to warrant the conclusion that he did not in
fact exercise his discretion and justify a review of his action." Id.; see State v. Rhodes,
818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Because so many different ingredients factor
into the sentencing process, and because the discretionary imposition of probation rests in
many cases upon subtleties not apparent on the face of a cold record, before the review
court may overturn the sentence . . . 'it must be clear that the actions of the judge were so
inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of discretion/" (citation omitted)).
A trial court's "|a]busc of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in
sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive
sentence.'" State v. Schweitzer, 943 P,2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations and
additional quotations omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion when it '"fails to
consider all legally relevant |sentencing] factors/" State v. McCovcy, 803 P.2d 1234,
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1235 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989)), or when
the trial judge fails to give '"adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances/" State
v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, «fl5, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah
1998)). This Court will find a trial court has abused its discretion when it concludes that
'"no reasonable (person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Schweitzer,
943 P.2d at 651 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
For example, in State v. Hopkins, 2006 UT App 498, 2006 WL 3648344, the
defendant "appeal[ed] her sentence, arguing that the trial court should have imposed
probation instead of [concurrent) prison terms." Hopkins, 2006 UT App 498, at * 1; sec
Addendum G. This Court affirmed, explaining that the trial court "accepted Defendant's
corrections to the [PSR]," "acknowledged that Defendant had no prior felony convictions
and that the corrected report would recommend only intermediate sanctions," and
"allowed Defendant to make a statement" and "to present mitigating information." l_d.
The trial court then "balanced the relevant factors presented by Defendant with the
objectives of deterrence and punishment," "determined that a grant of probation was not
appropriate given the gravity of the crimes," and "sentenced Defendant to two concurrent
terms of five years to life." Id
In this case, Mr. Ward argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not
suspending the sentence and putting him on probation. At the Change of Plea hearing,
Mr. Ward admitted that "|o]n November 15th 2007 and January 4th 2008," he "took
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property of a store without permission and with the intent to personally deprive when he
possessed a dangerous instrument, on one occasion a knife and on the [other] occasion a
box cutter." R. 8607(24); 0984(20); 45:7. He then accepted responsibility for his actions
and pleaded guilty to two counts of theft, a second degree felony. R. 45:3; see R.
8607(23-30; 31-32); 0984(19-26).
Mr. Ward has no juvenile criminal history. R. 33:4. He has an adult criminal
history, but it is composed mostly of misdemeanor offenses. R. 33:5-6. Other than the
current offenses, Mr. Ward's only felony conviction was a third degree felony involving
narcotics in 1996. R. 33:5-6. Mr. Ward was placed on probation for that felony
conviction, but, following a probation violation, he was ''submitted to the Diagnostic Unit
at the Utah State Prison . . . and then committed to the Utah State Prison." R. 33:7. He
also violated parole four times over a two-year period before he was discharged in July
2000. R. 33:2, 7.
Mr. Ward acknowledges that he has a criminal history, including the 1996 third
degree felony conviction, but he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his request for probation. Mr. Ward's criminal history does not appear to be the
history of a hardened criminal. Rather, it appears to be the history of a man struggling
with mental health problems and drug addiction. It was appropriate for the trial court to
consider "'deterrence and punishment" when imposing sentence. Hopkins, 2006 UT App
498, at * 1. Mr. Ward, however, believes that the trial court erred by allowing these
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factors to outweigh other more important considerations. Mr, Ward has only had one
previous opportunity for probation. He was unsuccessful on probation but that was nearly
twelve years ago. R. 33:7. Given the length of time that has passed since his last attempt,
Mr. Ward believes that the trial court should have given him another opportunity in this
case. On probation, he believes that he could have finally gotten the treatment that he
needs and could have overcome his problems with mental health and drug addiction,
Mr. Ward argues that it is evident from the record that the trial court was
"concerned about the recommendation" for incarceration. R. 41:3. The trial court felt
that Mr. Ward's case was "right on the borderline." R. 41:4. And it worried that Mr.
Ward had not received the treatment that he needed when convicted of the 1996 thirddegree felony. R. 41:4. Ultimately, the trial court denied probation and imposed the
prison sentence because it learned that Mr. Ward violated his probation in 1997 and
pulled a knife out during one of the current offenses. R. 41:5-7. Where the trial court
doubted whether prison was appropriate for Mr. Ward, however, Mr. Ward believes that
the trial court abused its discretion by sending him to prison rather than giving him the
benefit of the doubt.
Accordingly, Mr. Ward asks this Court to reverse and remand for resentencing
because he believes that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to be
placed on probation.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Ward asks this Court to reverse and remand for resentencing because he
believes that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to be placed on
probation.
SUBMITTED this _ > £ _ day ofJanuary, 2009.

0-U~

LOW J. SRPPI
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies of
the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Ileber M. Wells Building,
160 East 300 South, 6lh Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this
^ 0 ^ day of January, 2009.

LORI J. SEPPI

DELIVERED this ?

n

day of January, 2009.
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SEP 11 2008
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Gregory Maurice Ward,

ORDER
Case No. 20080478-CA
Case No. 20080479-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the court upon Appellant's motion.
It appears that judicial economy will result by consolidating
the appeals for a single determination. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that the above appeals are consolidated as Case No. 20080478-CA.
All future filings shall be filed under Case No. 20080478-CA.
Dated this /^yfr^day of September, 2008.
FOR THE COURT:

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 15, 2008, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to:
LORI J. SEPPI
SCOTT A WILSON
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 E 500 S STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4111
J FREDERIC VOROS JR
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: MARINA DAVIS & KIT SPENCER
4 50 S STATE ST
PO BOX 18 60
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
Dated this September 15, 2008.

By
Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20080478
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 081900984
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J DISTRICT COURT

FAX NO. f ^387404

P. 04

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 071908607 FS

GREGORY MAURICE WARD,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

DENO HIMONAS
May 2, 2008

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: BLAYLOCK, ROGER S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s); WILSON, SCOTT A
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 6, 1967
Video
Tape Count; 10:13
CHARGES
1. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 03/14/2008 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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JUN-02-2008 MON 08:26 AM

J DISTRICT COURT

FAX NO. r ?387404

P. 05

Case NO: 071908607
Date:
May 02, 2008

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Court orders this case run CONCURRENT with case #081900984.
for Time Served.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
ROBERT WOODS

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $350.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LDA
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Board of
Pardons.
Dated this

^

day of

t

-frfr/fm/

20 <3£-.

Page 2 (last)

Credit
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! DISTRICT COURT

FAX NO. f ^387404

P. 02

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 081900984 FS

GREGORY MAURICE WARD,
Defendant

Judge;
Date:

DENO HIMONAS
May 2, 2008

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor; BLAYLOCK, ROGER S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s); WILSON, SCOTT A
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth; March 6, 1967
Video
Tape Count; 10:13
CHARGES
1. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 03/14/2008 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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i DISTRICT COURT

FAX NO. f ^ ?387404

P. 03

Case No: 081900984
Date:
May 02, 2008

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Court orders this case run CONCURRENT with case #071908607, Credit
for Time Served.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
ROBERT WOODS

SENTENCE TRUST NOTE .
ATTORNEY FEES WERE ASSESSED ON CASE #071908607.

Page 2 (last)

TabD

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (2008)
§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—Civil penalties-Hearing
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii)plea of guilty,
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including
earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities,
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted
of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;

(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to
make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria
and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant
was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
2

(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a
warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i)
shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single
trip.
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the
county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it
may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution to the
county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after
sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the
county correctional facility; and
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section
64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in Section 6413e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102.
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount determined by
the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate incarceration costs
and medical and transportation costs for the county correctional facility.
3

(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for
an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by the
federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this Subsection
(6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall
consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302 (5)(c)(i) through (iv) and shall enter
the reason for its order on the record.
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county shall
reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a).
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 1; Laws 1983,
c. 85, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 3; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 156, § 1; Laws
1987, c. 107, § l;Laws 1990, c. 81, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 142, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 17, § 1;
Laws 1994, c. 13, § 19: Laws 1995, c. 111. § 1, eff. May 1. 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117,
3 l.eff.Mav 1, 1995; Laws 1995. c. 301, § 1. eff. May 1, 1995: Laws 1995, c. 337. $
1. eff May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 10, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996: Laws
1996, c. 40. 3 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 79, 3 98. eff. April 29. 1996; Laws
1996, c. 241, §§ 2, 3. eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 149, § 1. eff. May 4, 1998;
Laws 1999, c. 270, 3 15, eff. May 3. 1999; Laws 2001, c. 209. § 1, eff. April 30. 2001;
Laws 2002. c. 35. 3 4, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 280. § 1, eff May 5, 2003:
Laws 2006, c. 208, $ 1, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 154, 3 1, eff April 30. 2007;
Laws 2007. c. 339. § 3, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 353. 3 9, eff. April 30, 2007:
Laws 2008. c. 151. $ 1, eff. May 5. 2008.

4

UTAH CODE ANN, 76-3-203 (2008)
§ 76-3-203. Felony conviction—Indeterminate term of imprisonment
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, unless the statute provides otherwise, for a
term of not less than five years and which may be for life.
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, unless the statute provides otherwise, for
a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years,
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides otherwise, for a
term not to exceed five years.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-203; Laws 1976, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 88, § 1; Laws 1983,
c. 88. § 5: Laws 1995. c. 244. § 2. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws 1997. c. 289. § 2. eff. May 5.
1997; Laws 2000. c. 214. § 1. eff. March 14. 2000: Laws 2003. c. 148. $ 2. eff. May 5.
2003.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (2008)
§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—Supervision—
Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms and conditionsTermination, revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings—Electronic monitoring
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77,
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement.
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime
or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence
and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is
with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court
is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards
for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services
shall be provided.

(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the
supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to
the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider
appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise
the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However,
the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with
department standards.
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of
time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department
or information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter
38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(d) The presentence investigation report shall include:
(i) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted under
Section 77-18-1.1; and
(ii) recommendations for treatment of the offender.
(e) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic evalu2

ation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the
Judicial Council or for use by the department.
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the
court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the
presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and
the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of
the report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on
record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the
defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is legally liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the
court;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the
court finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic moni3

toring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 76-6-107.1;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a
GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior
to being placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 7727-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and
any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10).
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor
cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in
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Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the
account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon
its own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why the defendant's failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court.
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of
supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of
details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(1 l)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation docs not
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation docs not constitute service of time toward the total probation term
unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report
with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the
issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court.
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated
the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that
the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall
determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modifi5

cation, or extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the
defendant a warrant for the defendant's arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to
show cause why the defendant's probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended.
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing,
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if the defendant is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence.
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney
shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations arc
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless
the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in the defendant's own behalf, and present evidence.
(c)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation
term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division
of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State
6

Hospital or the superintendent's designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(34) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are
classified protected in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records
Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63G-2-403 and 63G-2-404, the
State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63G-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department
for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim
shall include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the
impact of the crime on the victim or the victim's household.
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406,5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in accordance with Subsection (16).
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as
described in this section until further order of the court.
7

(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant
and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either directly or by contract with a private provider.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 47, § 1;
Laws 1983, c. 68, § l;Laws 1983, c. 85, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 20, § l;Laws 1985, c. 212, §
17; Laws 1985, c. 229, § l;Laws 1987, c. 114, § l;Laws 1989, c. 226, § l;Laws 1990.
c. 134, $2; Laws 1991, c. 66, § 5; Laws 1991, c. 206, $6; Laws 1992, c. 14, § 3;
Laws 1993. c. 82, §7; Laws 1993, c. 220, § 3: Laws 1994, c. 13. § 24; Laws 1994. c.
198, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 230, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 146, effi May 1, 1995; Laws
1995, c. 117, §2. eff. May 1, 1995: Laws 1995, c. 184, § 1. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws
1995, c. 301. S3, eff May 1, 1995: Laws 1995, c. 337. $ 11, eff. May L 1995: Laws
1995, c. 352, § 6, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 103. eff April 29. 1996; Laws
1997. c. 390. $ 2, eff. May 5, 1997: Laws 1998, c. 94, § 10, eff. May 4, 1998: Laws
1999, c. 279, $ 8, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 287, § 7, eff. May 3. 1999; Laws
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2001, c. 137, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 7, eff. May 6. 2002; Laws
2002, 5th Sp.Sess., c. 8. § 137, eff. Sept. 8, 2002; Laws 2003. c. 290, $ 3. eff May 5,
2003; Laws 2005, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 14, § 3, eff July 1, 2005; Laws 2007, c. 218, $ 3. eff.
July 1,2007; Laws 2008, c. 3, $ 252, eff Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2193. eff.
May 5, 2008.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-4 (2008)
§ 77-18-4. Sentence—Term—Construction
(1) Whenever a person is convicted of a crime and the judgment provides for a commitment to the state prison, the court shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment unless
otherwise provided by law.
(2) The sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for an indeterminate term of not
less than the minimum and not to exceed the maximum term provided by law for the particular crime.
(3) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, every sentence, regardless of its form
or terms, which purports to be for a shorter or different period of time, shall be construed
to be a sentence for the term between the minimum and maximum periods of time provided by law and shall continue until the maximum period has been reached unless sooner terminated or commuted by authority of the Board of Pardons and Parole.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1994, c. 13, §26.
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1

March 14th 2008;

2

PROCEEDINGS

a.m.

THE COURT: This is the case of the State of Utah

3
4

10:34

versus Greg Ward.

It's Case No. 081900984.

5

Will you enter your appearances, please?

6

MR. WILSON: Scott Wilson for the Defendant Gregory

7
8
9

Ward.
MR. BLAYLOCK: Roger Blaylock for the State. Your
Honor, there should be two cases.

10

THE COURT: There are two cases. What's proposed?

11

MR. WILSON: Your Honor, on each one of the

12

informations the Defendant is going to plead to one count of

13

theft, a felony second and all the other charges are to be

14

dismissed.

15
16

THE COURT: Well, on the single count of aggravated
robbery is going to be just —

17

MR. WILSON: A theft.

18

THE COURT: Wouldn't it be aggravated?

19

MR. WILSON: No, just theft.

20

THE COURT: Do you have amended informations?

21

MR. BLAYLOCK: No. We just arrived at this agreement

22

today. It would be 76-6-404 in the Defendant's property from

23

another and at the time had a weapon.

24

MR. WILSON: A dangerous instrument.

25

Your Honor, it is in the other indictment — the

1

other information, I should say.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. WILSON:

4

alternative in that information.

Because he's charged with the

5

THE COURT: Okay.

6

MR. BLAYLOCK:

7

THE COURT:

8

I'm assuming there is no objection to

amendment by interlineation?

9

MR. BLAYLOCK:

10
11

Okay.

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

Sir, have you read the Statement of the

Defendant?

12

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

13

THE COURT: Did you understand it?

14

MR. WILSON:

15

THE COURT: Did you read it word for word?

16

MR. WILSON:

17

THE COURT: Did you understand it?

18

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

19

THE COURT: Do you read, speak, write, and understand

I read it to him, Your Honor.

I did.

20 I the English language?
21

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

22

THE COURT: What is the highest level of education

23 I you've had?
24 I

THE DEFENDANT:

Tenth grade.

25 I

THE COURT: Any questions about that document?

THE DEFENDANT:

No.

THE COURT: Are you thinking clearly today?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the advice that
you have received from Mr. Wilson?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

THE COURT: Want anymore time to think about these
pleas?
THE DEFENDANT:

No.

THE COURT: Do you suffer from any type of a
condition, physical, mental, emotional, for which you are
receiving treatment?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No.

Have you been prescribed any medications

that you are not current taking?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
the Defendant?

No.

Have you gone through the Statement of

Do you understand you are giving up a number of

extremely important rights by entering this plea?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

You are giving up your right to a speedy

public trial, is that clear?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

You are giving up your right to have an

iitpartial jury of your peers convene to hear and decide the

case; is that clear?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

You are giving up your right to put on a

defense, including compelling the attendance of witnesses to
came and testify on your behalf at no cost to you; is that
clear?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

THE COURT: You are giving up the right to sit in
open court with Mr. Wilson to confront and cross-examine the
State's witnesses and to test the State's evidence; is that
clear?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

THE COURT: You are giving up the presumption of
innocence, the right to require the State to prove each and
every element to the charges against you with proof beyond a
reasonable doubt; is that clear?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

THE COURT: If you did proceed to trial and if you
were convicted by a unanimous jury you would have substantial
appeal rights, that is the ability to go to another court and
ask that court to review the record here to determine if any
mistakes were made.

By in large, not entirely, but by in

large, you do give up those rights?
THE DEFENDANT:

Do you understand that?

Yes.

THE COURT: You been charged by amended information
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with two charges of theft as a second degree felony. A second
degree felony in this state is punishable potentially with
incarceration in the county jail for a period of — excuse me,
the state prison for a period 1 to 15 years, a fine of up to
$10,000 and an eighty-five percent surcharge, do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

THE COURT: Do you further understand that these
sentences may be caused — may be stacked one on top of the
other and or caused to run consecutively so that as a result of
your pleas today you are facing possibly a minium of two and a
maximum of 30 years in prison, if they were cause to run
consecutive, a fine of up $20,000, plus a eighty-five percent
surcharge?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And the factual basis.
MR. ELAXLOCK:

On November 15th 2007 and January 4th

2008 in Salt Lake County, the Defendant took property of a
store without permission and with the intent to personally
deprive when he possessed a dangerous instrument, on one
occasion a knife and on the occasion a box cutter.
THE COURT: Is that what happened?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are
guilty?

7

1

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

2

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ward, with respect to the

3

charge in the case ending 984, theft, a second degree felony,

4

how do you plead?

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT: With respect to the charge in case ending

7

Guilty.

I

607, a theft, a second degree felony, how do you plead?

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

Guilty.

I accept both of your pleas.

I find them

10

knowingly, freely, intelligently, volimtarily made.

I ask that

11

you sign the Statement of the Defendant.

12

presentment and incorporate it into the record by reference.

I will sign it upon

13

You have the right, sir, to be sentenced in not fewer

14

than two and in not more than 45 days. You also have the right

15

to ask that your plea be set aside at any time prior to

16

sentencing.

17

Do you understand these rights?

18

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

19

THE COURT:

I ask if you would be willing to waive

20

the maximum time for sentencing today so I may obtain a

21

presentence report?

22

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

23 I

THE COURT:

Let's have AP&P prepare a presentence

24 I report in connection with this matter —
25 I sentencing for —

or these matters.

Set

THE CLERK: May 2nd.
THE COURT: May 2nd at 9:00 a m.
Good luck, Mr. Ward.
THE DEFENDANT:
MR. WILSON:

Thank you.

Thank you, Your Honor.

(End of

Proceedings.)
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

( E l e c t r o n i c a l l y r e c o r d e d on May 2,

3

THE COURT: C o u r t would c a l l t h e c a s e s of

4

We've g o t q u i t e t h e c a l e n d a r

20O8)
G r e g o r y Ward.

today.

5

MR. WILSON: G r e g o r y Ward.

6

COURT BAILIFF: G r e g o r y Ward?

7

MR. WILSON: Y e s .

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

MR. WILSON: Your Honor, this is on for sentencing.

We

10

have gone over the pre-sentence investigation report.

11

find any factual corrections, except he points out that on page

12

3 of the report it says that he took four cans of Budweiser and

13

concealed them.

14

He doesn't deny shoplifting other than that.

15

that the pre-sentence investigation report is factually

16

correct.

17
18

We don't

Well, he brought those in the store with him.
So other than

THE COURT: Well, what did he shoplift, then, if it
wasn't the four cans?

19

MR. WARD: CD' s and —

20

MR. WILSON: CD's, your Honor, and some other things in

21
22
23
24
25

the store.
THE COURT: All right, so I'll strike the allegation
about the be<^r, find it doesn't a ffect sentencing .
MR. WILSON: Yo\jr Honor, we would ask that because
these are very small th efts, that it's thefts that have gone

-31

bad, he's running, he's trying to get away

2
3

—

THE COURT: Does it matter if they're small, if he's
got a knife, if he's only taking a little bit with the knife?

4

MR. WILSON: Yes, it does, yes, because of the

5

seriousness of it, because I don't -- he didn't -- he didn't

6

cut anybody, no one was injured.

7

desperate individual, and he was living on the streets.

8
9

You know, he's just a

I just think the recommendation is too much for the
crime.

That he obviously needs —

feels that he needs some

10

counseling both for mental health and for drugs.

11

in a substantial amount of time, so that we would ask the Court

12

to place him on probation with counseling for mental health and

13

drugs.

14
15

He suggested the Odyssey House.
THE COURT: Mr. Blaylock, I'm not —

I'm a little

concerned about the recommendation here,

16
17

He's been

MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, I think it results from his
record.

18

THE COURT: Yeah.

19

MR. BLAYLOCK: It involves -

20

THE COURT: I see that, but I've seen a lot worse.

21

I

mean, I think we only have the one felony conviction, right?

22

MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, there's an aggravated assault back
x

23

in

24

we don't have any Information on.

25 I

07, which is just a year ago.

Then we have a robbery that

THE COURT: I don't have an agg assault.

-41

MR. BLAYLOCK: Then a bunch of other retail thefts.

2

THE COURT: I have a simple assault.

3

The agg assault

was dismissed.

4

MR. BLAYLOCK: That's correct.

I'm just saying that

5

THE COURT: I've got retail theft, shoplifting, retail

6

theft, a B simple assault, retail theft, possession and —

7

got the one-third for narcotics that they put him in prison

8

for.

9

seems to me to be right on the borderline.

10

You know, I don't know about that.

I've

I mean, it's - - this
I'm not opposed to

making it zero tolerance and giving him a shot, but I don't

—

11

MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, I think the concern was that he

12

has been involved in a number of incidents that appear to be

13

—

THE COURT: You know what bugs me about this one?

—

Is

14

I'm a little concerned about that original prison commitment,

15

to start with, on a first third for a drug charge with a couple

16

of retail thefts, and we put him in prison right away, with no

17

treatment.

18

assume that that's where he ought to go each and every time.

19

Then since we put him in prison once before, just

MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, I think that may have arisen from

20

—

21

at, whether we have addressed some criminal activity in other

22

jurisdictions.

23
24
25 I

has he always lived here?

That's one thing I haven't looked

THE COURT: Well, we're not —
have a history

I have no idea, but we

—

MR. WILSON: He says he's lived here for 15 or 20

-51

years.

2

THE COURT: I've got a history here from '87 that is

3

MR. WILSON: Right.

4

MR. BLAYLOCK: But you were talking about the initial

5

conviction that sent him to prison.

6

THE COURT: Right.

7

—

I'm going to assume that they had

the same information that I had at the time,

8

MR. BLAYLOCK: Okay.

9

THE COURT: You know, prior to that conviction, he had

10
11

one possession

—

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Your Honor, I do show that he

12

was on probation with the Court.

He was on probation I think

13

(inaudible) violated the (inaudible) diagnostic in July '97

14

THE COURT: Is that right?

15

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: —

16

—

(inaudible) diagnostic he

was sent to prison.

17

MR. WILSON: And the concern I --

18

THE COURT: All right.

Well, that actually makes me

19

feel a little bit better about the original commitment, then,

20

rather than —

21

otherwise understand why he had earned a prison commitment.

22

MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, the concern that I have is his

because I couldn't, looking at that history,

23

response to being stopped by the store people is to threaten

24

them with a knife.

25

that was an appropriate response.

That's my main concern, is why he feels

-61

THE COURT: Well, did he brandish the weapon?

2 J

MR. BLAYLOCK: I think it was more a statement.

3

MR. WILSON: He says, "I have a knife.

4

MR. BLAYLOCK: Yeah, the other occasion that was filed

5

as an agg robbery, he made the statement that he had a gun and

6

was going to shoot somebody.

7

THE COURT: But he didn't have a gun.

8

MR. BLAYLOCK: No.

9

THE COURT: But he had a knife again.

Let me go."

10

MR. BLAYLOCK: Yeah, but he had

11

THE COURT: But he didn't brandish the weapon in either

12
13
14

—

case.
UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: It said —

it shows that he did

brandish the knife.

15

THE COURT: In which case?

16

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: On the Wal-Mart case, on the

17

'07 case,

18

MR. WILSON: It says —

my reading of it is that

19

MR. BLAYLOCK: I'm trying to remember if he had

20

MR. WILSON: —

—
—

is that he reached into the pocket of

21

his coat and said, "I have a knife.

22

to be secured without incident.

Let me go."

He was able

23

THE COURT: No, and proceeded to pull the knife.

24

MR. WILSON: Well, I guess I'm reading —

25 I second one on the factual

—

is that the

-7THE COURT: Yeah, it's the Wal-Mart case.

All right.

This is your chance to talk to me about your potential sentence
Mr. Ward.
MR. WARD: Your Honor, I've made some bad choices in my
life.

I'm 41 years old, and I've come to the conclusion that I

can't spend the rest of my life like this.
would need me, and I just need one —

I have kids that

I just need a chance to

prove that I can be successful and on the streets and taking
care of my business.

That's all I need is one chance, and I

promise you, you won't see me in this Court again.
THE COURT: Mr. Wilson, any legal reason of which you
are aware why I should not proceed to sentence?
MR. WILSON: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: With respect to the matter ending 8607, a
charge of theft as a second degree felony, I'm sentencing you
to the indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years at the State Prison.
With respect to the charge ending 0984, theft, a second-degree
felony, I'm sentencing you to the indeterminate term of 1 to
15 years at the State Prison.

They'll run concurrent with one

another, recommend that you receive credit for any time served.
You have 30 days in which to appeal.
MR. BLAYLOCK: No recoupment; is that correct?
THE COURT: Sorry, $350 for recoupment fee for the
services of LEGAL (inaudible).
MR. WILSON: And a pint of blood.

Thank you, your

-81 I Honor.

That's all I have at this time.

2

(Hearing concluded)
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
ORME, Judge:
*1 We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs
and record[,] and the decisional process would not
be significantly aided by oral argument."Utah
R.App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented
are readily resolved under applicable law.
Defendant appeals her sentence, arguing that the
trial court should have imposed probation instead of
prison terms. "The defendant is not entitled to probation, but rather the court is empowered to place
the defendant on probation if it thinks that will best
serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the
public interest "State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048,
1051 (Utah Ct.App.l991).&e also State v. Sibert, 6
Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (1957) ("Probation
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is not a matter of right, and this is so no matter how
unsullied a reputation one convicted of a crime may
be able to demonstrate to the trial judge."). Defendant nonetheless argues that the trial court abused its
discretion because it failed to consider all legally
relevant factors and imposed an excessive sentence.
Although there were errors in the presentence report, it is clear from the record that the trial court
accepted Defendant's corrections to the report. The
trial court acknowledged that Defendant had no prior felony convictions and that the corrected report
would recommend only intermediate sanctions. The
court allowed Defendant to make a statement, in
which she apologized, and allowed her to present
mitigating information, including that she never
possessed the gun, that she had made positive progress during her jail stay, and that she needed to go
through drug treatment and other counseling. Thus,
the requirements of rule 22(a) were satisfied. See
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a).FN1
FN1. Defendant points to State v. Galli,
967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), as authority for
her claim that the court failed to address
certain necessary factors in its probation
determination. Galli, however, simply reiterates statutorily prescribed factors to be
addressed in a determination of consecutive sentences, which Defendant did not receive. See id. at 938.
After presentation and consideration of all this information, the trial court sentenced Defendant to
two concurrent terms of five years to life, reasoning: "I do think considering everything that
I've-that has been presented and that I've read that
it's too serious simply for alternative sentencing."Thus, the court balanced the relevant factors
presented by Defendant with the objectives of deterrence and punishment, see Rhodes, 818 P.2d at
1051, and determined that a grant of probation was
not appropriate given the gravity of the crimes.
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Defendant does not argue that the sentence otherwise exceeded that allowed by law, and we do not
see that the sentence was in any other respect excessive, illegal, or unfair. Thus, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sentence.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge and
CAROLYN B. MCHUGH, Judge.
Utah App.,2006.
State v. Hopkins
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 3648344 (Utah
App.), 2006 UT App 498
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